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Cognitive researchers often carve cognition up into structures and processes. Cognitive processes 
operate on structures, like vehicles driving over a map. Language alongside semantic and 
episodic memory are proposed to have structure, as are perceptual systems. Over these 
structures, processes operate to construct memory and solve problems by retrieving and 
manipulating information. Network science offers an approach to representing cognitive 
structures and has made tremendous inroads into understanding the nature of cognitive structure 
and process. But is the mind a network? If so, what kind? In this article, we briefly review the 
main metaphors, assumptions, and pitfalls prevalent in cognitive network science (maps and 
vehicles; one network/process to rule them all), highlight the need for new metaphors that 
elaborate on the map-and-vehicle framework (wormholes, skyhooks, and generators), and 
present open questions in studying the mind as a network (the challenge of capturing network 
change, what should the edges of cognitive networks be made of, and aggregated vs. individual-
based networks). One critical lesson of this exercise is that the richness of the mind as network 
approach is a powerful tool in its own right; it has helped to make our assumptions more visible, 
generating new and fascinating questions, and enriching the prospects for future research. A 
second lesson is that the mind as network--though useful--is incomplete. The mind is not a 
network, but it may contain them.  
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In recent years, cognitive networks have received tremendous interest (Baronchelli, 
Ferrer-i-Cancho, Pastor-Satorras, Chater, & Christiansen, 2013; Borge-Holthoefer & Arenas, 
2010; Castro & Siew, 2020; Karuza, Kahn, Thompson-Schill, & Bassett, 2017; Siew, Wulff, 
Beckage, & Kenett, 2019). Cognitive networks refer to the application of methods from network 
science to study the complexity of cognitive systems, mainly language and memory (Castro & 
Siew, 2020; Siew et al., 2019). The success of cognitive networks is due to a number of factors, 
including the ability to quantify structural characteristics, such as nearness and farness, between 
behaviors, concepts, and memories (Kenett, Levi, Anaki, & Faust, 2017; Kumar, Balota, & 
Steyvers, 2020), the potential for enrichment or degradation of the network map—such as in 
creativity (Kenett, 2018, 2019; Kenett & Faust, 2019b) and age-related cognitive decline (Borge-
Holthoefer, Moreno, & Arenas, 2011; Kenett et al., 2018)—and the possibility that aspects of 
cognitive control (executive function) influence network navigation (Hills, Mata, Wilke, & 
Samanez-Larkin, 2013). 
As two avid users of network science, we constantly discuss and often disagree about big 
details. For example, is creativity explained by a change in the map (i.e., the network 
representation; Kenett & Faust, 2019b) or is it a consequence of the vehicle (i.e., the cognitive 
processes such as cognitive controlthat navigate the network; Silvia, 2015)? Is memory one 
representation or is it many? If it is many, then memory search may be amenable to ‘short-cuts’ 
or ‘wormholes’, by which travel between two distant places in a network can be shortened by 
briefly traveling via another representation (Wulff, Hills, & Hertwig, 2020). How do we separate 
the map from the vehicle experimentally? If one researcher infers a difference in representations 
between two groups (e.g., young vs. old), might that difference also be explained by a change in 
the processes, such as cognitive control, without a difference in the underlying networks (Siew et 
al., 2019)?   
Questions like these are often the outcome of better understanding the metaphors we have 
adopted and the assumptions we have made. Cognitive network science is a technical and 
theoretical framework. As Jones and Love (2011; p. 170) describe, there is “a danger of 
confusing technical advances with theoretical progress, and the allure of the former can lead to 
the neglect of the latter. As the new framework develops, it is critical to keep the research tied to 
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certain basic questions, such as: What theoretical issues are at stake? What are the core 
assumptions of the approach?”  
Our goal here is to take these concerns seriously in an honest self-appraisal of our 
discipline and its theoretical contributions to understanding the mind. In what follows, we will 
discuss the main metaphor that dominates cognitive network science—the map and vehicle 
model—and the assumptions it often elicits. Then we will highlight alternative metaphors 
(wormholes, generators, and skyhooks), based on varied empirical findings. Finally, we will 
highlight core challenges that cognitive network science must address to advance our 
understanding of the complexity of the human mind. 
 
2. The map and vehicle framework 
 
William James presented a metaphor of mental ‘travel’ when he proposed that we search 
memory like we search for a lost item in our house, first checking one room and then another 
(James, 1890). This invites one to imagine our memories as a kind of map—or as Tolman put it, 
a cognitive map—over which some kind of mental vehicle travels (Tolman & Tolman, 2004). 
Indeed, any account of cognitive phenomenon requires a description of both what the cognitive 
system knows (the representation) and what it does (the process) with that information 
(Anderson, 1990; Estes, 1975).  
Take, for example, the case of modelling the semantic fluency task, which is often used 
in clinical practice (Kenett & Faust, 2019a): ”say  all the animals you can think of.” Here the 
researcher’s goal is to be able to predict the list of animal names that an individual is likely to 
produce: e.g., dog, cat, monkey, giraffe, etc. To do this, one first needs to represent how animals 
are related to one another in the mind. A mathematical description of this space, representing the 
distances between different concepts, works nicely to represent the map. Such a matrix (or 
graph) is a network. Second, one needs to formally describe some kind of process that acts over 
that network, allowing names to be activated in a series (Hills, Jones, & Todd, 2012; Zemla, 
Kenett, Jun, & Austerweil, 2016). The representation is a map, and the process is a vehicle; 
together they make explicit the cognitive components necessary to understand how the mind 
solves this task. 
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This map and vehicle framework represents a core assumption that underlies many 
network science approaches to cognition. The instantiation of the map and vehicle model varies 
across researchers; sometimes there are multiple maps and sometimes there are many vehicles, 
but the conceptual core is the same. Below, we use this core framework to unpack a number of 
potential assumptions about the practice of cognitive network science, while also highlighting 
some of the open questions that remain to be addressed and exploring what it would mean for the 
mind to be a network. 
 
2.1. One Network to Rule Them All 
Suppose you assume that the network on which you model your semantic fluency data is 
based on the same representation for everyone (Figure 1). So, no matter how old or young, or 
how much a lover of Attenborough or hater of the outdoors, everyone is assumed to know the 
same animals and to represent them in the same way. We call this approach the one-network-to-
rule-them-all assumption. Someone trying to infer the process people use to navigate this 
network will find that nature lovers have excellent memory search processes. The home-bodies, 
on the other hand, will appear to be mentally impaired, unable to retrieve information from the 
network that everyone is assumed to have. This may sound silly, but exactly the same approach 
has been used by Hills, Mata, et al. (2013) to make inferences about executive cognitive control 
processes in the aging mind. If you assume everyone has the same network, then you guarantee 
the differences will be in the process. 
 
2.2. One Process to Rule Them All 
Alternatively, one can imagine that everyone has the same process and look for 
differences in the representation (Figure 1). This is the one-process-to-rule-them-all assumption. 
For example, you might ask people to produce associations for a set of words. This data—
producing targets in response to cues—can be used to construct networks (De Deyne, Kenett, 
Anaki, Faust, & Navarro, 2016; De Deyne, Navarro, Perfors, Brysbaert, & Storms, 2019). If the 
participants are split into different groups based on some other measurement, such as intelligence 
(low vs. high), the networks constructed out of their aggregate data might look different. One 
might then conclude that low- and high-intelligent individuals represent information differently. 
Again, this may sound silly, but exactly the same approach was used by Kenett et al. to evaluate 
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the semantic representations of low and high creative individuals (Kenett & Faust, 2019b). If you 
assume everyone has the same process, then you guarantee the differences will be in the 
representation. 
 
2.3. Can representation and process be disentangled? 
The above examples are necessarily simplified, but things can get tricky in a hurry. A 
specific example (described in more detail by Jones, Hills, & Todd, 2015), involves two different 
approaches to modelling the semantic fluency task described above. Both took a map and vehicle 
approach, and both used a one-network-to-rule-them-all assumption. One constructed the 
network out of free associations, derived from another database of free associations wherein 
people said the first words that came to mind when presented with a cue word, like cat (Abbott, 
Austerweil, & Griffiths, 2015). The second constructed the network using a semantic space 
model applied to a corpus natural language, based on using patterns of word-occurrences to 
detect word similarity (Hills et al., 2012). For search over the free association network, Abbott et 
al. (2015) assumed a process (i.e., vehicle) made up of random walkers, who moved from the last 
word produced randomly over the network to activate nearby words. For the semantic space 
network, Hills et al. (2012) assumed the process was a common probabilistic choice rule (the 
Luce choice rule) that chose nearby words in proportion to their similarity with the previously 
recalled word. In this second case, if there were no nearby words, a secondary ‘switching’ 
process was assumed to choose a new word based on its frequency in natural language—leaving 
the local constraints of the network to jump to a new location. Abbott et al. (2015) demonstrated 
that the two approaches were able to generate similar phenomenology using different processes 
(random walkers versus a switching process) and different representations (free associations 
versus semantic space). Following Anderson (1978), Abbott et al. (2015) put it like this: 
“behavior that seems like the signature of one mechanism can sometimes be produced by 
others.”  
In relation to the core question of this article, if the mind is a network, the natural 
extension to this question is “which one”? Theoretical progress in cognitive network science 
requires that we become more proficient at comparing our alternatives. There are many ways to 
do this: model competitions, cross-validation, model recovery, parameter evaluations, qualitative 
comparisons to various datasets, and so on (e.g., Shiffrin, Lee, Kim, & Wagenmakers, 2008). 
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With respect to representation and process, we can independently sample cognitive control 
measures (Hills et al., 2013; Hills & Pachur, 2012; Kenett, Beaty, Silvia, Anaki, & Faust, 2016), 
introduce secondary tasks that interfere with control processing (Rosen & Engle, 1997), use 
neuroimaging to identify control processing (Beaty, Benedek, Silvia, & Schacter, 2016), and 
evaluate more nuanced differences in the behaviour, such as reaction time data (Kenett et al., 
2017; Kumar et al., 2020). Given a sufficiently large set of possible processes and 
representations, we are likely to find a variety of process-representation pairs that are difficult to 
discriminate without formal model comparisons.  
Though it is debated under what conditions we can investigate process and representation 
independently (Siew et al., 2019), the reality is that if we cannot discriminate representation and 
process our ability to make general inferences from cognitive network research is highly 
constrained and likely to be presumptive whenever we attribute explanations to structure or 
process without testing the alternatives. 
 
Figure 1: The core metaphor of cognitive network science and two typical assumptions. Map 
and vehicle. This is a common implicit framework for many network approaches to cognition in 
which nodes represent behavioural outputs. The network is the structural representation over 
which some process (e.g., vehicle) navigates. One-process-to-rule-them-all assumes that all 
participants have the same process and that only the structure of the network representation may 
change. One-network-to-rule-them-all assumes that everyone has the same representation and 
one can therefore examine individual differences in processes (e.g., a Luce choice rule, random 
walkers, a sailboat). 
 
3. Alternative cognitive network metaphors 
The observations we discuss above are meant to shine light on one overarching 
assumption (the map and vehicle) and two common practical assumptions (one-process/network-
to-rule-them-all) that may often be at work when taking a network approach to cognition. But let 
us take a second to challenge the most alluring assumption of all: is the mind a network?   
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If the mind is a network, the map-and-vehicle approach already suggests that a network 
(or map) is incomplete. From a purist perspective, a network and the mathematical matrix that 
represents it does not do anything; one must apply a secondary process to deliver some output in 
response to some input. It is instead the knowledge representation of the system that may be 
mathematically equivalent to a network. Metaphors of knowledge representations have ranged 
across such diverse things as a cow’s stomach (Hintzman, 1974), an acid bath (Posner & Konick, 
1966), a library card catalogue (Forster, 1978), steam engines, and a digital computer (for a 
review, see Turvey & Moreno, 2006). Still, the most persistent metaphor is of memory as akin to 
a physical space (Roediger, 1980), satisfying the network assumption of a quantifiable distance 
between ‘places’ in the space. Plato and Aristotle (cited in Roediger, 1980) considered memory 
as a kind of wax tablet. Freud (1920) revived this idea with his mystic writing pad. James (1890) 
proposed that memory was like a house one could walk around in and Collins and Quillian 
(1969) expanded the idea to a subway map. Collins and Loftus further developed this idea to 
suggest that memory is structured as a network that constrains a process of spreading activation 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). Hills (2006) went on to suggest that the similarity between external 
and internal representations facilitated the evolution of a common search process to navigate 
them. 
This leads us to the map and vehicle framework, which has had substantial success in 
describing cognitive phenomena, as cited throughout this article. Graphs (i.e., matrices) and their 
corresponding networks quantify the structure of cognitive space and provide the kind of pin-
headed angel counting required to distinguish one theory from another. Nevertheless, the map 
and vehicle metaphor is but one way to achieve that. What are the alternatives? 
 
3.1. Wormholes  
A common assumption in cognitive network science is that the mind uses a single fixed 
network. Even if different people have different network representations, they each have but one. 
One cannot jump from one network to another within the same mind. The network one is 
assumed to have is also rigid and inflexible—one cannot emphasize certain edge properties over 
others, as edges are often deemed to have a binary value (present or absent) or to be a weighted 
output of their subcomponents that are themselves no longer separable.  
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However, consider searching for country names from memory (“Switzerland”, 
“Germany”, “The UK”, etc).  In this case, we may sometimes feel we are searching based on one 
kind of feature—such as the spatial proximity of a shared border—and at other times feel we are 
searching based on phonological similarity, as one might have when recalling the ‘Stans’, i.e., 
“Kazakhstan”, “Kyrgyzstan”, “Pakistan”, and so on. The ability to search via different features 
may suggest the existence of more than one localist network representation and the capacity to 
switch between them, or similarly, the capacity to restructure a single network by emphasizing or 
de-emphasizing the different kinds of features that make up its edges. We consider these 
cognitive wormholes, because they would allow cognition to bend internal space in a directed 
fashion by emphasizing one network representation to another (Figure 2).  
Wulff, Hills, and Hertwig (2020) studied a milder wormhole hypothesis by having people 
retrieve names of countries either by continent or by first letter (from A to Z). They hypothesized 
that a continent-based search would emphasize a spatial representation, as if the person were 
imagining a map. Similarly, they hypothesized that an alphabetical search would emphasize a 
phonological representation, as if the person were sounding out the first letter. The data 
suggested that people followed these predictions. However, evidence of phonological retrieval 
was apparent in the by-continent condition, and evidence of spatial retrieval was apparent in the 
alphabet condition. This suggests that people can bend their internal representations by 
emphasizing different edge properties (e.g., phonology or spatial proximity) in the underlying 
network—even though they do not appear to be able to separate these in entirety. 
This inability to completely separate networks is consistent with tip of the tongue states, 
in which people express difficulties in retrieving names and get stuck on misleading phonemes, 
even though they can also access semantic information (Brown & McNeill, 1966; Vitevitch, 
Chan, & Goldstein, 2014). Thus, while some evidence of wormhole space bending exists, it 
seems less clear that memory is represented by separable networks.  
The above data suggest that task context can influence the structure of a searchable 
cognitive representation, but that it is likely to remain a single cognitive representation (Kumar, 
2021), though it appears to be a little bendy. To get from one place to another, one must search 
its structure locally or, as noted in the previous Section 2.2, use control processes that escape the 
local structural constraints. Importantly, it illustrates that there is an interaction between the 
process and structure. Therefore, a one network/process to rule them all model is inadequate, 
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challenging us to consider different frameworks that allow us to advance our thinking on the 
relation between them. 
 
3.2. Skyhooks 
Can a one network to rule them all model account for human performance in cognitive 
tasks? As we discuss in section 2.3., two competing models predict performance in a semantic 
fluency task: random walks and clustering-switching processes. Importantly, a complete model 
of the task must account for controlled, goal-directed cognition, which may require an integrated 
approach that combines elements of both (see Goñi et al., 2010 for one such example). 
As discussed, one popular model suggests that when participants are performing a 
memory search task they switch between a ‘local’ representation (the network) and a ‘global’ 
frequency list (e.g., Hills et al., 2012; Hills et al., 2013; Hills & Pachur, 2012). This capacity to 
jump using frequency is somewhat similar to a wormhole, except that frequency has no local 
structure. Having just found the 100th most frequent animal does not—as far as we know—make 
it easier to retrieve the 99th most frequent animal. In this sense, frequency does not shrink the 
distance between targets in memory, it simply allows one to escape resource-poor locations on 
the internal map, a process we suggest is similar to a skyhook (Figure 2).  
Relevant to our discussion on representation and process, these skyhook-like global 
transitions are correlated with measures of executive cognitive control (Hills et al., 2013; Hills & 
Pachur, 2012; Rosen & Engle, 1997). Executive cognitive control is also dynamically involved 
in creative thinking (Chrysikou, 2019). This suggests a nice analogy between thinking out of the 
box and getting off your cognitive map. Individuals with better performance on measures of 
executive control retrieve more items from memory and are better at retrieving original ideas 
(Beaty, Kenett, Hass, & Schacter, 2019; Volle, 2018). Thus, executive control can potentially 
evaluate the local prospects in the representation and act as a skyhook to transfer attention 
elsewhere if local opportunities are looking sparse (Figure 2).  
The skyhook metaphor adds an additional process to the “is the mind a network” 
question, which currently stands at map plus vehicle. This new skyhook process is related to 
effortful cognitive control because it is constrained by a cognitive load. It instantiates the 
effortful component in psychology’s well-established distinctions between automatic and 
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effortful processing (Kahneman, 2011). Correspondingly, more automatic processes may 
encompass aspects of the vehicle when it is on the map. 
 
3.3. Generators 
Another common observation about cognitive representations is that they change over 
time. This requires us to invoke processes associated with network change, such as learning and 
forgetting. New nodes and edges can be formed and potentially lost; we can learn new object 
concepts and their associations. We can also combine existing nodes to create new nodes, what 
one might call cognitive griffins (a griffin had the head and wings of an eagle and the body of a 
lion). Indeed, we know that memory works like this; Bartlett’s (1995) work in Remembering and 
much research since has shown that much of cognition is constructive. Stories evolve in their 
retellings (Jagiello & Hills, 2018; Moussaïd, Brighton, & Gaissmaier, 2015) and we can 
construct alternatives that we have never experienced (Hills, 2019). Thus, nodes can in principle 
form and move in relation to other nodes. The map itself can change, and any metaphor of the 
mind must be able to account for such change.  
Though network learning models exist for evaluating how concepts might be learned 
from their environment (Engelthaler & Hills, 2019; Hills, Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & Smith, 
2009a), these models largely aim to predict what order, for example, children will acquire new 
words. A deeper question asks how concepts are formed and may change in relation to one 
another. More specifically, what are nodes and edges constructed of? Understanding the 
processes that generate nodes may help us understand how they can change. 
Neural networks may offer a useful process metaphor for understanding node behavior. 
Neural networks are different kinds of networks than cognitive networks, both in relation to 
structure and process. Structurally, cognitive networks usually adopt a localist representation—
cat is a single node—whereas neural networks adopt a distributed representation—cat is 
distributed across multiple nodes. In terms of process, how nodes change is not yet well-
described by cognitive network science. However, neural networks learn using prediction error 
and alter their distributed representations via feedback (Lecun, Bengio, & Hinton, 2015). 
A particularly useful instantiation of a neural network that may be analogous with neural 
processes in the brain (Gershman, 2019) is a generative adversarial network (Figure 2). A 
generative adversarial network contains a generator and a discriminator: the generator learns to 
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generate data (e.g., cats) which can fool the discriminator which learns to detect data categories. 
Both the generator and the discriminator learn through their interaction. A cognitive instantiation 
of a generative adversarial network can both learn to infer structure (e.g., categories) from data, 
but also produce data from categories, producing outputs that have never been seen before (e.g., 
novel faces). Note that the discriminator classifies the data into specific categories (our classic 
idea of nodes), but can also produce outputs that lie between other outputs, merging details from 
multiple starting categories (Karras, Laine, & Aila, 2019).  
A cognitive system with similar abilities could create novel nodes, such as the meaning 
of cabbage cage or gravy orgy, which also represent the kind of novel high-entropy stimuli 
associated with humor (Siew, Engelthaler, & Hills, under review). Moreover, if as network 
scientists we want to imagine that the nodes in our networks represent constellations of neural 
activity in a brain, then we must accept that cabbages, cages, and cabbage cages all represent 
different patterns of activity across a distributed representation (e.g., Musz & Thompson-Schill, 
2015). There is therefore a potential infinity of neural states and associated nodes in our 
networks.  
This truth is embedded in the neuroscience: short- and long-term synaptic plasticity 
means that constellations of neural activity involve many thousands of continuously tuning 
synapses, making our ‘network’ nodes moving targets (Holtmaat & Svoboda, 2009). This invites 
us to think of our output nodes as constructions of other nodes (“wavy”, or some other 
probabilistic variation, e.g., Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011), somewhat similar 
to the interactive activation model of word recognition with adjustable weights (McClelland & 
Rumelhart, 1981). 
A more recent model of semantic representation shares an architecture similar to our 
generative analogy (Jamieson, Avery, Johns, & Jones, 2018; McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992).  In this 
architecture, words are not abstracted into prototypes by averaging across the contexts in which a 
word appears—which is the more typical method of distributional semantics. Instead, words 
preserve their idiosyncratic regularities in an exemplar representation, which captures individual 
contexts. This allows a retrieval process to recover meanings associated with various homonyms 
and polysemes (e.g., break as in smash or break as in report)—a standard problem for 
distributional semantic models. The model proposed by Jamieson et al. (2018)—the instance 
theory of semantics—distributes concept information across features and allows memory traces 
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to be constructed at retrieval based on differential feature activation.  This may offer a process 
based mechanism for deriving wormhole-like behaviour and it also has the properties of the 
generator we propose here. 
 
4. Core challenges in cognitive network science 
 Wormholes, skyhooks, and generators offer metaphors to further elucidate the underlying 
assumptions of the map and vehicle framework by suggesting how they might be otherwise.  
There are several additional core challenges that cognitive network scientists should be aware of, 
which represent both pitfalls and opportunities: What “stuff” make up the edges in cognitive 
networks, how can we measure the effect of change and context in cognitive networks, and the 
ability to measure individuals, not just be aggregated data of groups.
 
 
Figure 2. Alternative to the standard map and vehicle framework. Wormholes allow individuals 
to take shortcuts across a network by using a separate network that contains a more direct path to 
the destination. Skyhooks represent cognitive processes that cause motion on the network 
independent of the network structure. Generators represent multipartite networks in which the 
top-level localist network is constructed from activations of a lower-level distributed network.  
 
4.1. Network Chimera 
What holds the mind’s nodes together? What are its edges (the links between nodes)? 
Importantly, even in the  related field network neuroscience, researchers still discuss what the 
edges should be in functional MRI connectivity-based networks (Lurie et al., 2019). In cognitive 
network research, the discussion is a bit more muted, but needs to take place. Researchers have 
wielded a strikingly large set of materials with which to link their network nodes, such as 
phonological similarity (FAT and CAT are neighbors; Vitevitch, 2008; Vitevitch & Castro, 
2015), perceptual features (a banana is yellow and so is a school bus, Sizemore, Karuza, Giusti, 
& Bassett, 2017), functional features (a hammer hits and so does a bat; Engelthaler & Hills, 
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2019), co-occurrences in language (Beckage, Smith, & Hills, 2011), semantic similarity derived 
from text (Bhatia, 2017; Hills et al., 2010), orthographic similarity (Siew, 2018), similarity of 
responses to items in questionnaires (Christensen, Kenett, Aste, Silvia, & Kwapil, 2018), and 
many other things (Siew et al., 2019). Is one of these the answer?  
It is tempting to suggest that edges in a memory network, for example, can be inferred 
from free association data (Abbott et al., 2015; De Deyne et al., 2019; Kenett et al., 2017; 
Kumar, 2021; Kumar et al., 2020). However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying free 
association and its ability to reliably represent individual-based and group-based representations 
are far from understood (Nelson, McEvoy, & Dennis, 2000). We can measure associations from 
people by giving them a cue word (e.g., cat) and asking for the first word that comes to mind, the 
target (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 2004). Other free association data collection approaches 
require participants to generate multiple responses (De Deyne et al., 2019; Kenett, Kenett, Ben-
Jacob, & Faust, 2011). There are large collections of these free association norms (e.g., De 
Deyne et al., 2019; Nelson et al., 2004). Free associations are a common approach to estimate 
networks and have been used to model everything from memory retrieval (Steyvers & 
Tenenbaum, 2005) to word learning (Hills, Maouene, Maouene, Sheya, & Smith, 2009b).  
However, Jones et al. (2015) argued that free associations have a Turk problem. The 
problem is named after the 18th century chess-playing automaton, the Mechanical Turk, which 
secretly housed a chess-playing boy. Similar to the Turk, free associations (especially when 
multiple response are required) may secretly house one or more processes. In other words, they 
may not be a process-free read out of an individual’s underlying cognitive representation. If 
researchers are trying to explain the cognitive processes that produce a certain behavior, using 
free associations may obscure that process. Alternatively, if one is representation-process 
agnostic—and indifferent to the underlying mechanism driving the behavior—then free 
associations may be easy and ideal. If nothing else, they are often a good place to start in 
identifying differences, before one moves on to exploring the processes that give rise to those 
differences (see Hills, Maouene, Riordan, & Smith, 2010 for an example of exploring what may 
drive a free association pattern in a network). 
What edges work best are likely to depend on the question one is trying to answer. For 
children learning early words, co-occurrences in language appear to outcompete other measures 
(including free associations) in predicting order of word learning (Hills et al., 2010; Hills et al., 
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2009b). But different questions about word learning provide roles for different kinds of networks 
(Hills & Siew, 2018). In some cases, evidence against one kind of network representation (e.g., 
features: being furry, having eyes, etc) is revived when the process used to construct edges is 
revised. For example, Hills et al. (2009b) showed that feature networks were not effective at 
predicting the order of children’s word acquisition when network edges represented one or more 
shared features. However, Engelthaler and Hills (2017) found that if they reframed feature 
networks based on distinctiveness—how dissimilar are two objects—they could predict word 
order using features. This invites us to consider that network edges are themselves the outcomes 
of cognitive processes.  
An alternative to committing to a single type of edge is to keep all the different edge 
types and represent them in different layers, in what are called multiplex networks. Various 
approaches to multiplex networks have proven to be quite enlightening  (Stella, 2019, 2020; 
Stella, Beckage, & Brede, 2017; Stella, Beckage, Brede, & De Domenico, 2018; Stella & Brede, 
2016; Stella & Kenett, 2019). Moreover, recent work has shown that the relative layers of 
multiplex networks (e.g., phonology, co-occurrences, and free associations) vary in their 
predictive power over time in relation to early word learning (Stella, 2019; Stella et al., 2018)—
which indicates a general need to attend to individual differences (e.g., age-related differences) 
when testing process and representation hypotheses. Moreover, multiplex networks may offer a 
substrate to explain the wormhole findings discussed above and the short-term network change 
described below (Kenett & Thompson-Schill, 2020). 
 
 
4.2. Network Change 
Given that cognitive representations may change as we learn or age, it is useful to ask 
whether and how networks change over time (Figure 3). A few studies have investigated the 
effect of aging on semantic memory, or the aging lexicon (Wulff, De Deyne, Jones, Mata, & 
Consortium, 2019). A seeming paradox in aging research is that while many cognitive capacities 
decline over time, people accumulate more semantic knowledge as they age (Park et al., 2002). 
Aging cognitive network studies report structural properties of the lexical representation that 
vary across the lifespan (Cosgrove, Kenett, Beaty, & Diaz, 2021; Dubossarsky, De Deyne, & 
Hills, 2017; Wulff, Hills, & Mata, 2018; Zortea, Menegola, Villavicencio, & Salles, 2014) and 
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find that concepts in older adults’ semantic memory are less well connected and are more 
segregated (any pair of concepts in the network are “further apart”) than those of younger adults. 
For example, Dubossarsky et al. (2017) analyzed the network structure of free associations 
obtained from a cross-sectional sample across the lifespan to estimate semantic networks for 
groups of young, middle-aged, and older adults. The authors find a U-shape change in semantic 
memory properties across the lifespan: Semantic memory starts off as sparse, increases in density 
towards midlife, which is then followed by increasing sparseness in late life (Dubossarsky et al., 
2017). Cosgrove, Kenett, Beaty, and Diaz (2021) have recently shown how such structural 
changes lead to diminished flexibility in these networks. Importantly, such aging differences 
across the mental lexicon may be related to changes in retrieval processes, which are also known 
to change across the lifespan (Salthouse, Atkinson, & Berish, 2003). 
Short-term change in cognitive networks may also occur (Kenett & Thompson-Schill, 
2020; Yee & Thompson-Schill, 2016). Kenett and Thompson-Schill (2020) estimated semantic 
networks based on free associations, before and after a short-term cognitive manipulation where 
they primed participants to process concepts via different strategies. These strategies either had 
participants focus on the dominant features of these concepts, or on relations between these 
concepts and other concepts (Kenett & Thompson-Schill, 2020). The authors found that 
processing concepts based on the relations between them led to changes in the post-manipulation 
semantic network. In addition, the authors show that in a baseline condition—where pre- and 
post-semantic networks were estimated without the manipulation task—there were no 
differences between the two networks, suggesting they remained stable. 
However, an alternative interpretation to the findings of Kenett and Thompson-Schill 
(2020) is that the manipulation task affected participants sensitivity to different features of the 
concepts, which led to different retrieval processes during the post-manipulation free association 
task, and not to changes at the representational level. Such an account fits with the instance 
theory of semantic memory described above (Jamieson et al., 2018), and also dynamical attractor 
network models, which model how an input to the network (such as thinking about a concept) 
may change the state into which the network settles depending upon the time course of input 
activation (e.g., conceptual combinations). For example, Lerner et al. has shown how associative 
thinking and semantic priming can be modelled based on such attractor-based models (Lerner, 
Bentin, & Shriki, 2012, 2014; Lerner & Shriki, 2014).  
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To address this alternative perspective, Kenett and Thompson-Schill (2020) conducted 
several additional analyses of the behavioral data collected to show that the conceptual 
combination manipulation similarly affected the free associations generated after the 
manipulation, compared to those generated before, but that the content of retrieved associations 
was different, according to the manipulation. These findings may provide indirect support for 
representation-based, and not process-based, change. However, this evidence can also be 
explained by the instance theory of semantic memory (Jamieson et al., 2018). Thus, whether the 
representation level was affected at all, and to what extent these short-term effects persist 
remains an open question. 
 
4.3. Aggregated Networks 
The majority of network research is group-based, aggregating data from multiple 
individuals to compare differences in representation and process. The problem with such a 
group-based approach relates to a larger more general issue in cognitive research related to 
problems of making inferences about individuals from aggregated data (Estes, 1956; Myung, 
Kim, & Pitt, 2000). Consider the studies described above regarding differences in the semantic 
networks in low and high creative individuals (Kenett & Faust, 2019b). Creativity varies across 
individuals, yet these cognitive network studies aggregate participants into low and high creative 
groups. Aggregation of individual data poses potential problems and it is not well understood in 
cognitive networks science. Thus, where possible, we recommend collecting individual data.   
Some studies have collected individual networks from either the individuals themselves 
or their environments (Benedek et al., 2017; Hills & Pachur, 2012; Hills & Segev, 2014; Morais, 
Olsson, & Schooler, 2013; Zemla et al., 2016). For example, Morais, Olsson, and Schooler 
(2013) applied a “snow-ball” sampling method to collect associative networks for individuals, 
taking the targets produced during one sampling event as cues in subsequent sampling events, a 
procedure which took 30 to 60 days to complete. Zemla et al. (2018; 2016) combined multiple 
re-iterations of the semantic fluency task with Bayesian modelling to estimate an individual’s 
semantic network for the animal category. Finally, others have used relatedness judgment tasks, 
where participants rate the relatedness of pairs of words, to estimate the semantic network of 
these words, an approach that has been conducted across several languages (Benedek et al., 
2017; Bernard, Kenett, Ovando-Tellez, Benedek, & Volle, 2019; He et al., 2020). Individual data 
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can be especially useful for teasing apart differences in representation and process. An 
individual’s network can be collected independently of the processes they use to navigate it, 
which can be further investigated using additional cognitive control tasks, for example, allowing 




Figure 3, Core challenges in cognitive network science. Network chimera represents the 
challenge of identifying the proper edges when there are many to choose from. Network change 
represents the challenge of characterizing how networks and processes change over time. 
Aggregate networks represents the challenges of understanding aggregate networks built from 




Is the mind a network?  Our analysis suggests that the network analogy is far from 
complete. While the mind clearly represents information, and that representation may be usefully 
approximated as a network, the characteristics of retrieved knowledge as dealt with by cognitive 
network science cannot be reduced to a network. The reigning assumptions (one network or 
process to rule them all) already invite a map and vehicle metaphor. Indeed, it is not yet clear 
how to capture representational data without involving some form of retrieval process. Though 
we discuss numerous ways to disentangle these, the mind (which we have only defined from a 
functionalist perspective) would seem to at least involve process and representation.   
We also grappled with additional assumptions: bendy networks (wormholes), 
executive/cognitive control processes (skyhooks), and nodes as dynamic and distributed 
representations (generators). Given the kinds of questions cognitive scientists are likely to ask 
about cognition, these too would seem to be required for a complete understanding of cognition. 
In practice, the emphasis on a map or vehicle varies across practitioners of the network arts. The 
alternatives we enumerate here (and no doubt others) have yet to be examined and many 
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theoretical issues remain in mid-embrace. Thus, in answer to the question of “where do we go 
from here,”  Table 1 provides an overview of existing assumptions as well as the new metaphors 
and challenges that remain open questions for future work.  
It is always useful to examine our metaphors and the limitations they may obfuscate as 
well as the alternatives that may liberate them.  We hope to have captured some of that intention 
here, recognizing that our approach is still likely to be limited. There is of course additional 
phenomenology that cognitive network science has yet to address and that we did not discuss in 
detail.  These include problems like chunking in memory, procedural knowledge, personality, 
episodic memory, the difference between experts and novices in strategic control (e.g., in chess), 
and so on. These remain exciting open challenges for cognitive network science and we are 
hopeful that the application of cognitive network science will remain a useful tool in contributing 
to how we understand these questions. 
Nonetheless, one clear finding of this exercise is the substantial progress cognitive 
network science has made on various fronts in a relatively short amount of time, and the 
numerous ways in which network science has demonstrated the importance of structure and 
control in explaining cognitive phenomena. We might turn to the brain for some help in guiding 
us towards a future cognitive metaphor. The controlled semantic cognition framework suggests 
that semantic cognition involves the interaction between two neural systems: conceptual 
knowledge and control processes that guide retrieval (Lambon Ralph, Jefferies, Patterson, & 
Rogers, 2017; Rogers, Patterson, Jefferies, & Lambone-Ralph, 2015). According to this model, 
the control processes are “implemented within a distributed neural network that interacts with, 
but is largely separate from, the network for semantic representation” (Lambon Ralph et al., 
2017; p. 49). This framework suggests that it should be possible to study representation and 
processes separately at the cognitive level. More importantly, it highlights the strengths of 
incorporating findings and insights from brain research into cognitive theory. 
Nevertheless, and despite its limitations and required theoretical and methodological 
growth, we argue that cognitive network science is a powerful quantitative perspective to capture 
the complexity of cognition. Its central contribution is its ability to understand how 
representations differ, how they are acquired, and how they engage with other processes to 
influence behavior. Moreover, the quantitative language of networks allows us to conduct novel 
research that combines and cuts across different levels of analysis (neural networks, cognitive 
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networks, social networks), allowing us to ask new research questions that were not possible to 
ask before. In sum, cognitive network science poses the potential to significantly impact our 
theories and operationalization of complex cognitive phenomena. Though assumptions abound, 
in many cases the alternatives to these assumptions represent untapped opportunities to advance 
new theoretical and empirical cognitive science.  
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Table 1: Assumptions, alternatives, and core challenges that lie at the heart of cognitive network 
science. For each of these issues, we highlight the key questions an avid cognitive network 
scientist should be cognizant of and examine as they set forth in a cognitive network research. 
 
Assumptions on the network model 
Map and vehicle Cognitive processes consist of 
information representations and 
processes that operate on these 
representations to generate behavior.  
One-network-to-rule-them-all If you assume everyone has the 
same network, then you guarantee 
the differences will be in the 
processes. 
 
One-process-to-rule-them-all If you assume everyone has the 
same process, then you guarantee 
the differences will be in the 
representation. 
 
Alternative cognitive network metaphors 
Wormholes Can people access more than one 
network independently in the same 
task, or is there one fixed network? 
 
Generators Are nodes fixed or might the network 
be better represented as a multipartite 
network, for which the location of 
nodes in the network are influenced by 




Skyhooks Is there a non-network process (e.g., 
executive attention) the influences 
movement on the representation? 
 
Core challenges in cognitive network science 
Network chimera Are you studying a particular kind of 
edge or a particular kind of behavior? If 
the latter, are edges one feature or 
many? Can you compete different 
edges against one another? 
 
 
Network change Does the network change in a 
predictable way with age or 
experience? 
 
 Aggregated networks Is the network aggregated data, which 
may obscure underlying structure or 
processes?  Do you have access to 
individual data?  
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